Recent announcement of the World Bank offer of Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in Nepal may have given positive inspiration for many government forestry officials, NGO workers and some unemployed forestry professionals. I am working on the impacts of forest carbon credits on economies. Based on that knowledge the programme may benefit forestry professionals but it makes rural communities further worse off.
This programme not only down sizes the rural economies but also increases more unemployment and regional development imbalances. This is the political game of international resource mafia to benefit for materially and symbolically powerful countries providing some flash incentives at local and national levels. The Bank has tried in institutionally weak countries where people can make little voices against their programme. This is high time of fair minded professional people to voice against the bad programme. Some of you might have read that I had raised the forestry carbon issue in United Nation Forestry Forum before the announcement. Please read my views below.
CARBON LIABILITY, NIMBY SYNDROME AND SUCCESSFUL VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS
Environment/forestry support and research agencies have attracted attentions of people on financial benefit from participating in voluntary forestry carbon markets. However, the liability issues of the forestry carbon markets are little discussed. Wrong policies and practices of land uses can not only destroy livelihoods and marginalise for long term but also take lives of rural poor people. Therefore I have attempted to collect and share some of the issues and information. The following my ideas also could be too critical for some readers particularly those have high expectations on the voluntary forest carbon market or its promoting agencies.
1. Carbon Liability
From my understanding, forest carbon credit markets work on a legally binding policy. The REDD policy implies that restricting the harvesting beyond the level stated in contract. This also intends to increasing high forest for additional unit of carbon sequestration. At the time of assessment the sellers must have maintain forest carbon amount on the site equivalent to the units stated in contract. Otherwise the sellers need to surrender his/her credits or compensate by buying from markets. To get more carbon income more carbon units need to be stored. Some studies showed that forestry carbon credit liability even reduces land expectation values (LEV) which could be important for private forestland holders. Environmental policy analysts can demonstrate the LEV change in a simple spreadsheet model.
The seriousness of liability depends on government policy and carbon price behaviour in market. New Zealand has implemented Kyoto forest policy which would be a good example to understand the liability issue. A policy analyst, Maclaren (2008) stated that old forest estate holders need to pay about NZ $ 16000 for 28 years old stand of planted radita pine forest at $ 20 per ton carbon dioxide. The New Zealand forest owner association bulletin reported that "As "generous" compensation, they [pre-1990s forest owners] will be grand-parented an allowance equivalent to around 5% of the area normally converted in any year, but only until 2020. In contrast the liability backdated to 1 January 2008, will apply to the entire pre-1990 estate forever" (p. 1 under the title "New tax discourages new planting". Though the emission trading scheme got introduced in forestry effective from January 2008 there are many policy issues to be resolved. However, the government is planning to compensate 39 credit units per hectares which will be equivalent value of NZ $ 700 at current price. Because of transaction cost forest holdings less than 50 hectares are exempted from the policy (Maclaren 2008). To avoid the liability, some forest holders harvested all their forestry (Lane 2007; Smith 2006) which resulted to highest deforestation in 50 years history of the country. Post 1990s forest holders are not interested to participate in the emission trading scheme due to liability for forest harvest. If forest holders want to harvest the forests with carbon credit hold they need to surrender the credits equal to the carbon emission from the harvest. If the land is converted permanently onto forestry the new forestry planter may have some risk free carbon credit equivalent to the amount (about 15-30 percent) stored in soil.
There is high price risk of carbon (Chlandna 2007). If they sell their forest carbon credits now to the polluted industries they need to sale at low price. The credit price may go up highly in forest harvesting time that may make the forest owner loss. For example, the US government had issued Sulphur dioxide emission allowance credits at the rate of US $ 100 per unit in 1993 which value increased over $ 1500 in 2006 (Eckert 2006). Because of this risk, some forestry owners are thinking to hold the credits now and bank for future uses. Many others have no interest to participate in the carbon trading scheme for avoiding the liability, price risk and transaction cost. The fate of the forests non-participated in carbon credit markets at the time of national carbon budget deficit at the end of commitment period is unclear. All the above issues have broken the spirit of landholders to increase their land use in planted forest. This is the situation in the country having government highly responsive and generous to people. It give some ideas that how serious can be the liability issue in politically complex, institutionally weak and bad bureaucratic countries
In developing countries many of people have not private landholdings adequate to make forestry plantation to the level of participating in carbon market. Any people get for carbon credits which could be from their community forests. Once they get paid for stored carbon unit in the forest, they must be maintained the level as stated in contract. In market based mechanism they get paid only for storage of additional amount of carbon unit. Every year the forest debt gets built up as the owners get paid. Forest resource does not grow constantly like water flow from spring. Their income declines as the forest growth declines. However, the liability goes forever. As a result the debt passes to their heirs (Maclaren 2008).
Because of public forest the government can charge royalty. When community lands were barren local people were grazing their livestock free of charge. As the land converted into forest the government agency take a major share of forest harvest in joint management in India. Similar case may apply in carbon market too. Releasing the forests for economic uses is less likely in India and China due to their increasing pollution levels. For poor communities it is difficult to payback the credits and make their forest credit freehold. As a result their forests will be locked forever which means the forests will be changed into permanent carbon sink. The restriction on forest uses will affect regional economic development and population distribution. For example, rural farming economies have been collapsed in remote and food scarcity regions of Nepal (Bhatta 2002) as international agencies did strategic intervening on community resources uses (Hobley 1996; Hausler 1993; Ives and Merselli 1989) Edmonds 2003). Millions of dollars and many years require to be re-established the economies.
2. NIMBY Syndrome
To avoid the deadly effects on national economies from excessive land use in forestry for carbon emission some powerful countries have followed clever policy strategies. Let us take the UK government policy as an example. The country belongs to the group of highest polluting countries and has used its more than 73 percent national land areas in farming (Crabtree, 2006; Newcombe et al. 2006). Average farm size is 70 hectares. The land in forestry is only 11.8 percent (FAO 2005). To protect national economies, its parliamentary select committee has proposed a policy for the government that "The government must to work to ensure that any successor to the Clean Development Mechanism embraces smaller projects, projects in the most poor and unstable countries, and also forestry and land-use projects founded upon preservation as well as planting. Avoided deforestation needs a much greater priority accorded to its both within and outside the Clean Development Mechanism. … Some of the most rigorous and environmentally beneficial of all projects come from the stewardship of tropical forests and the well-judged re-forestation or afforestation of land in the tropics." (House of Commons 2007 p. 4). The report has given too much stress on increasing and controlling forests in tropical countries but remained silence to increase forestry land use in own country. The government people know that people's access to land is very limited in many tropical countries. Under non-market carbon off-set policy the foreign division, the DFID has achieved its goal of increasing forestry plantations in community pasturelands and control on uses forest in overseas by using various intervention strategies: policy advocacies, technical supports and financial incentives. The management of the agencies know well that thousands of poor farmers of developing countries have suffered from its forestry programmes but it has continued its programme in new territories. Many other materially and symbolically powerful countries have followed the clever strategies to avoid the negative effect of excessive land use in forestry. In literature the behaviour of making own area free from dumping wastes and wanting to be in others' locality is termed as a NIMBY syndrome. The REDD policy benefit for the countries with such NIMBY syndrome.
3. Voluntary Forestry Carbon Market
In response to my argument of last month posting, Mr. Ashley Camhi replied that "My understanding of REDD is that it is a voluntary program. No one is forcing "poor rural people" to sign their lives away by turning their forests into permanent carbon storage facilities.……. REDD is one way that landholders can benefit financially from their natural resources." The following points may answer the queries of people similar to Mr. Ashley Camhi.
Many environmental agencies have often claimed that voluntary forestry carbon markets are beneficial and successful in low emission countries. Based on level of people's access to land resources, their using practices and characteristics of social institutions, I do not believe that the voluntary forestry carbon markets including the REDD benefit the poor counties. I have taken an example of the most successful voluntary carbon market project funded and supported by World Bank, USAID, Clean Air Corporation (CAAC) and Dow Chemicals as stated in ODI (2006) paper. I have quoted some sentences the report which provides some sense for readers to understand the success of the carbon project. Details are available in ODI and the project websites.
"The International Small Groups Tree Planting programme (TIST) is a project generating revenue for small producers through the sale of emissions reduction credits in the voluntary carbon market. It is a reforestation programme operating in Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and India, involving over 25,000 farmers. TIST also aims programmes and HIV/AIDS awareness……[Tree planting] Techniques used include using tighter spaces for planting, conserving water by using holes instead of rows, improving weeding and using compost as a fertiliser. …….Only trees left standing qualify for payments, a system which incentivises preservation of trees. It is estimated that a typical group (up to 12 people) planting 2,000 trees could make up to $40 per year, and raise an additional $450 through higher yields from the use of conservation farming".
Based on my life and work experiences in similar communities' situations, the project is certainly not demanded by communities and implemented with fair cost benefit analysis. In my assessment the project has exploited the poor communities demanding too much contribution in the plantation work. The requirement of using compost as a fertilizer may be for justifying environment friendly (organic) carbon credit (a crazy idea). Moreover the plantation might have affected household livestock holding and compost production for crop production. The effects can be much higher as the forestry plantation areas increase. If those forests had had managed to produce multiple products and complement private land resources of poor households that would benefit local communities many times greater than that of carbon credit based management. Similarly the credit freehold forests can be managed for multiple uses which would contribute for environment conservation much more than the carbon credit-hold forest. Forest/ environment bureaucrats also would make a fewer hurdles on the forest uses.
In most of developing countries people are hardly informed the real intensions and potential consequences of environmental, forestry and biodiversity conservation programmes. The interest agencies show local reasons and benefit for the people to introduce the policy or programme. Most of rural communities have little capacity to do cost benefit analysis accounting economic and social impacts of conservation interventions. They need to rely on information of the external agencies. Implementation agencies use various strategic measures (media campaigns, social traps and psychological pressures) to get cooperation of community people and achieve the objective of the programmes. Victim groups cannot defend against the strategic interventions. Even support staffs knowledgeable on the problems cannot defend against the dominant policies and programmes and protect the poor people, otherwise they could be sacked. Even the situation finds in national policy decision level in developing countries. For example, as the World Bank and its allied (FAO and World Watch Institute) warned that Nepal was approaching to environmentally disaster conditions by 2000, the government started looking the solutions to protect lives and livelihoods of people. Considering Nepal as an institutionally weak country, international agencies offered technical and financial supports to formulate forest development policies for fulfilling basic need of rural people. These support agencies (Asian Development Bank, FINIDA, World Bank and many other overseas development agencies) advised for "reducing and controlling livestock numbers" (pp. 148), do plantation on the community pasturelands for increasing high forests and reduce consumption of forest products (Forestry Sector Master Plan 1988). The government followed the policy advises and implementation support offered by those materially and symbolically powerful foreign agencies. The policy increased high forest covers but acted as slow poisons for local economies, and remote rural poor people are being most victimised (Bhatta 2002). Later their intensions got disclosed that they were interested to use the community lands for global environment conservation and lease hardwood timber forests for an international private company. Many international experts based in a big city with luxurious lifestyles hardly attempt to understand the resource politics, social problems, institutional tarps and heartbreaking moments in societies of developing countries. Most of forestry and environment conservation policies and programmes are implemented telling lie to local people.
References
- Chlandna, Z. 2007. Determination of optimum rotation period under stochastic wood and carbon prices. Forest Policy and Economics. 9:1031-1045
- Chicago Climate exchange 2004. The Sulfur Dioxide Emission Allowance Trading Program: Market Architecture, Market Dynamics and Pricing.
- Crabtree, B. 2006. Cost-benefit analysis of UK forest policy. In Environmental Valuation in Developed Countries. Edited by David Pearce. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pp. 36-49
- Eckert, N. 2006. US SO2 Emission Allowance Price History. Ministerial Meeting within the North Sea Conference. Gothenburg 4/5 May 2006. European Climate Exchange
- FAO. 2005. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management. FAO Forestry Paper 147. Rome. FAO
- House of Commons. 2007. The voluntary Carbon offset market. House of Commons. Environment Audit Committee, the UK. Sixth Report of Session. 2006-07. http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/c... . Downloaded on 4July 2008-07-04
- Kreutzer, J. R. 2004. Cap and Trade: How the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Market Works, and How it Could Work Better. Bepress Legal Series Paper 344
- Lane, P. 2007. A Snapshot of Plantation Forests as at 1st April 2006. New Zealand Journal of Forestry. 52(1). 40-42
- Maclaren, P. (2008). Carbon gains, losses and risks. New Zealand Tree grower. 29(1): 7-10
- Master Plan. 1988. The Forestry Sector Master Plan. Ministry of Forest, Nepal. Kathmandu.
- Newcombe, J. Ozdemiroglu, E. and Atkinson, G. 2006. Towards green sectoral accounts for UK agriculture. In Environmental Valuation in Developed Countries. Edited by David Pearce. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pp. 409-434
- Peskett, L. Luttrell, C and Brown, D. 2006. Making voluntary carbon markets work better for the poor: the case of forestry offsets. Forestry Briefing, 11. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). http://www.odi.org.uk/fecc/RESOURCES/briefing-papers/0611_voluntarycarbo... Downloaded on 4July 2008-07-04
- Smith, B. 2006. Area of forest 'at risk' from deforestation . Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Wellington. http://www.maf.govt.nz/climatechange/background-reports-and-analysis/are...
Your article
Dear Bhubaneshwar
I have rarely read such unmitigated rubbish! I recently also saw your other paper on Carbon Politics beyond the Chainsaw charter" to immoral forest acrbon trade regime.
Yopu frequently quote out of context, misquote or state positions that are out of date. Ceratinly your concutions are not derived from rational and objective review of literature and information, but seem to be derived from having a big chip ion your shoulder (for some reason).
One small example, we all realise that the WB in 1978 warned of total deforesttion in Nepal by 2000. Now we know that their views were wrong and their response was also wrong. However we all learn from experience and it is unfair to call this propaganda - this view was widely held at the time by many people. Of course we know differently now and current World Bank aid for forestry in India certainly does not convert pastureland into high forest for carbon sequestration as you suggest (without any evidence).
On another point you say "The management of the (DFID) agencies know well that thousands of poor farmers of developing countries have suffered from its forestry programmes but it has continued its programme in new territories". Again you present no evidence for this assertion which is completely untrue.
I would suggest that you concentrate on facts and quality information - not hearsay. Of course there are some problems likely to occur with the global carbon sequestration mechanism - the challenge is to make it work for the benefit of the rural poor. So please don't sit in your green pastures of New Zealand and lob criticism at your former colleagues who are working hard for the benefit of Nepali people.
Peter
RED : Defending Ideas Requires Evidences and Logics Points
Dear Peter
Thank you for reading my comments about RED programme and the other document what have to have read by people like you. I also appreciated your realization that the forestry and environmental problems of Nepal interpreted by the World Bank and other agencies, and the policy models and practices introduced to address the problems are wrong. It is unfortunate of poor communities that people like you who have realized the problems, have not have translated the realizations in practices. They are rather advocating for and introducing further worse policies and practices. For example the RED project, which is of another extremely from what rural people need to get relief from existing social and economic problems.
Though you may be more knowledgeable than me I like to state some critical points of RED and clarify my stand against it. There are some essential implementation conditions for achieving the goal of the RED project. I cite only two points of them stated in working paper of the World Bank (2008 p.8) which information may be enough to understand problem of RED for people who have known the sociopolitical and geo-economical situations of Nepal.
“a) At project commencement most of the project area is already accessible to deforestation agents”.
“b) Baseline activities that may be displaced by the RED project activity include fuel-wood collection, charcoal production, agricultural and grazing activities.”
The conditions are written in unclear words but the conditions will be tough at implementation. The first point implies that the project targets in the forests of community access and economic uses. The second point is clear that existing economic activities get reduced. When the project commence many activities will be carried out using various strategies to increase carbon sequestration and storage in the forests. It is essential because without increasing carbon there will not be incentives for investment agencies. The activities further restrict people’s access to forests. The government policies under international pressure may force government officials to adopt further harsh means despite unwillingness. Though there is no binding agreement to be restricted on land use change and extraction community people are still unable to utilize forest resources due to constrains of prevailing policies and problems of forest management support service providers. The binding agreement makes the situation further worse. The income from carbon credit sell does not compensate the total economic loss and solve the other problems associated with unemployment and side impacts of regional development. International control on local resources and debt transfer to nest generation could be other social issues.
It is binding agreement based programme which will be very difficult to change once implemented. Previous experiences in forestry and environmental resource sectors showed that even non-binding policies are found difficult to change. For example following the directives of the UN Agenda 21 (Combating Deforestation) and Forest Principles of the Earth Submit to increase forest contributions to global environment conservation, the government also introduced the Forest Amendment Act 1998 and a mandatory forest inventory. The policies dictated compulsory forest inventories and limited forest harvesting to less than 40 percent of mean annual increment (MAI) for slow growing species and 60 percent of MAI for fast growing species. The policy has damaged rural economies and ceased local people’s rights. Most of people in professional field including bureaucratic position know that the policies are implemented to compensate the environment quality ruined by polluted industries, crazy adventures people and luxurious societies at the cost of poor communities. However, these are not changed. People knowledgeable about the notorious policy and practices remained silence. In turn, the international resources mafia kept on imposing more and more notorious policies and programmes to squeeze livelihoods of poor people and benefit powerful groups of the world. They make the situation more complex and worse. I felt that it is also my social responsibility to voice against the inhuman actions. Therefore I openly wrote against the policies and practices, and ignored the challenges, risks/threats and criticisms of other people like yours. Nepali people wherever live-in green pasture, smoke, desert or war, they try to response if they realize the anything going wrong in the country. Honest and humanly behaving people even of your countries also response similar way if they feel something is making people suffering in Nepal.
Your responses on my concern on RED show your professional knowledge, expatriate personality and intension on the resources of poor communities. You spent most of your efforts and knowledge to criticize my ideas. If you had spent the efforts to give specific professional logics to be the rural poor people better off from the RED programme that could prove your professional identity and international expatriate soundness. A number of studies done from DFID funding have shown that poor people are disadvantaged and marginalized in DFID supported forestry programme areas. You defended that the DFID management has not known the problem which means the studies are done just for formality. They are not communicated at management level. I consider international expatriates like you are a kind of ambassadors of their countries for developing countries including Nepal. If the expatriates like you had well communicated the problems of low income countries, the policy decision makers of your countries had not have made the inhuman policies (eg. those I quoted) to be benefited from poor communities and institutionally weak countries. On Nepalese forest management, you still have influences from your expatriate personality and saying on DFID funding. If you work by changing your wrong values, attitudes and temptation on resources of poor communities, you can make a big difference on the lives of some communities from the personality and funding. Then your commitment and love to poor people and Nepal expressed in word could be translated in reality. If you have not really seen the papers about forestry programme associated marginalization of poor households in DFID areas, please write me I am please to send you a list of some references.
Regarding comments about professional people, I have not claimed that I was good and my colleagues are bad. If you had read the paper clearly you could understand that the behaviours are outcomes of bad institutions. I also had behaved same way what they are doing now. I have well understood that they are trapped from many problems and limitations. Even if they know some policies programmes or practices introduced by powerful people or organizations are against the wellbeing of poor people they should remain silence and are force to follow for survive in the jobs. Any profession cannot be change towards good direction without reviewing, realizing and improving weaknesses. I stated not for bad intension but to make them realization. They will realize in future if any people have perceived by intension of commenting professional institutions on the other way.
Reference
World Bank. 2008. Methodology for Estimating Reductions of GHG Emissions from Mosaic deforestation. http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=DocLib&CatalogID=41513 Downloaded on 2August 2008.
B.Dhakal
Profound studies needed
Dear Bhubaneswor,
Thank you for your ideas and defending standpoints regarding the potential risks the REDD might impose on Nepalese rural livelihoods. However, I diagree with you that REDD 'definitely' makes forest dependant Nepalese people worse off. Actually we have not undertaken a thorough benefit-cost analysis of carbon trading (under CDM or REDD) against the existing forest practices. In a case study of leasehold forestry I have estimated that the average annual gross income from afforestation/reforestation under CDM can outweigh that from the existing 'forage-based' practices barring a number of 'transaction costs'. Therefore, the study is still inconclusive.
Carbon trading is a contested issue, but founded knowledge/data/information would be useful to defend or reject such ideas including REDD. So far a number of Nepalese individual experts and institutions including FECOFUN demanded that CFs be paid for the carbons they sink or sequestrate (e.g. Karky et al 2007). They lobbied that 'avoided deforestation', for carbon trading to benefit from existing forests. While so doing, they implied for 'REDD' because majority of the CFs are the existing forests, which could not be brought under afforestation/reforestation under CDM of Kyoto Protocol. While demanding CF to be included under carbon trading, we forgot that more than 10,000 hectares of open lands were planted even after the year 2000, which could be brought under CDM easily (hopefully it would be more beneficial given the low opportunity cost of the barren land). That way we rejected even to enter CDM. Now that REDD has been feasible in Nepal since Perish meeting, the 'experts' like you stand completely against it from the very beginning. What I would suggest is that more researches and studies be undertaken in carbon trading in association with livelihoods of forest dependant poor. Since Nepal has been selected one of the three Asian countries to be eligible for initial funding under REDD, why not follow 'learning by doing'to better understand the implications of REDD for Nepalese economy?
Regards,
Sindhu Prasad Dhungana
Response to Dr. Bhubahneswar's article
Dear Mr. Bhubaneshwar,
First of all, I appreciate your parochial response on REDD. I also acknowledge your concern about the resource poor of Nepal, being left out again. However, going through your article and not aware exactly of what my other two colleagues, Peter and Sindhu ji wrote, I would like to respond to your article. Since I was thickly involved in preparing R-PIN, a response from my side is overdue as follows:
• If we consider the names of countries sanctioned R-PIN, we also notice that the countries are mostly located in the tropical zone (i.e. in or around equator zone). I can counter your argument of institutionally weak countries having been selected by endorsing that WB has chosen, by proving that countries which are biodiversity-hotspots of the world (Madagascar, Costa Rica, DR Congo, Guyana etc.), including Nepal (R-PIN mentions Terai forests as biodiversity hotspot) and having extremely high potential (biomass growth) of sequestering carbon at faster rate are considered. Some of these countries may be institutionally weak is a coincidence and actually does not mean that institutionally strong countries are not chosen (I am convinced that countries such as Costa Rica, Vietnam, Mexico, Guyana if not more are institutionally stronger than India for instance). Similarly, if Nepal is not institutionally strong then it would have collapsed so far as a nation after a political turmoil of a decade. That’s not the case and Nepal has emerged much stronger and determined after CA elections.
• Your quoting of several data is grossly misleading as you are basing your whole lot of assumptions by taking up data from CDM models, which were anyway destined to benefit rich countries and were not meant as charity to the resource poor of the world. You have downloaded quite a lot of data for your arguments and I am sure that you also know that loads of data are available on websites on the better sides of REDD. We are all aware that CDM has not delivered and that neither in reducing GHGs and nor in addressing poverty alleviation. So I don’t really understand what you want to prove by comparing confusing CDM-data with REDD, which is not even developed as concept as yet. That CDM has failed or has benefited only rich/developed countries (including where you may be living) is big lesson for those who are involved in designing an inclusive national REDD framework. To put it bluntly, tell us, which development programme has directly and conclusively addressed poverty alleviation on sustainable basis. Even after 20 years of community forestry experiment in Nepal or India we still do not conclusively tell ourselves whether resource poor, women and ethnic groups have been benefited on a sustainable basis. Then why to raise such a hoax about REDD, which is not even conceived as yet. I think it is like smelling the rat before it has come out from the hole!!!!!!!!
• Nepalese, R-PIN, (I am sure you have gone through it) is forthright enough to raise concerns about poor forest governance and overall benefits so far not having reached conclusively to those who deserve it most. So in our case there is no hidden agenda. It is up to all those countries now (who have got R-PIN sanctioned) to go through a consultative process and develop a national REDD framework for Nepal which is gender sensitive, inclusive and equitable. In the R-PIN you must have seen that the professionals who were involved in Nepal’s R-PIN preparation are indigenous and experienced enough to meet concerns you have tried to cash upon.
• In REDD, we see that it’s a unique opportunity to leverage on positive experience Nepal had so far in participatory forest management as well as the effort this country has put in forwarding the conservation agenda despite a very turbulent political phase behind it. The grant 14 tropical and sub-tropical countries will receive is meant to support and build their capacity for REDD and tap into future systems of positive incentives for REDD. You have to give some credibility to group of very high professionals represented in the FCPF Steering Committee comprising an equal number of developing and industrialized countries, plus observers from international organizations, non-governmental institutions, and forest-dependent indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers. The committee was assisted in its decision by an independent Technical Advisory Panel comprised of experts in different technical fields and different regions of the world. All innovators and foresters are very eager to initiate this partnership and assist countries while building a body of knowledge on how best to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by protecting forests and helping the people who benefit from them. The FCPF is an important mechanism for giving effect to what was agreed at the Bali climate change meetings in 2007 – that donors and developing countries should work together to trial approaches to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The selection of this initial group of developing country partners is an important first step in improving global understanding of ways to reduce forest carbon emissions and lift forest-dependent communities out of poverty. You are dumping an innovative idea to address global agenda of climate and poverty –which is only a trial so far- as an internecine design for making world’s poor more poorer. I think climate agenda and the agenda of poor is much more important than the vendetta-like article you are trying to cash upon. The fact remains that REDD is a creative idea for seeking an additionality of benefits to those who have cared and lived for forest and environment.
• In REDD we are talking about building national framework and not one-off CDM project (I am sure you know about this). When we make national framework, of course we by design will have to look in to issues you are trying to raise through default. It is about GHGs and not only carbon. Also it is not only forest but also other sectors (e.g. renewable energy) those lend to reduction of GHGs. It is about a credible and verifiable monitoring system (looking in to inclusiveness etc.), and I think we have time up to 2012 to see that we have a framework which is holistic, a tough job !!!! But only those who are innovating on right ideas and concepts can perceive the long-term benefits.
• I think your text on victimization of poor sounds more like a hysterical reaction. Let us be clear on one thing. Neither golden chicken exists as yet nor the golden eggs for hatching. Hence I would get down to nitty-gritty of mean annual increment, carbon rate per ton, outreach to poor while I am designing the REDD framework and since we have all burned our fingers with CDM, we are better prepared for REDD.
• I salute to Nepal! It has, as country shown a great statesmanship and stewardship by applying for REDD funds from WB. With this it has shown that climate matters and responsibility of Nepal as nation for the whole Hindukusch Himalayas also matters. Nepal can be innovator on REDD and represent the case of those countries, which have a very effective community forest management systems in place and can show how business in carbon can benefit the local poor and the world. By any means, it is responsible and bold act. With the wide range of stakeholders and professionals involved to make REDD national framework happen, I am convinced that Nepal will use the unique opportunity to demonstrate how poverty alleviation as an issue can be incorporated as a global agenda and as a major component of REDD.
Well, despite your concerns about liabilities, syndromes etc, I really think it sounds more as “washing dirty linen” for the heck of it!!!!!. I think by putting your article in the cyberspace, you are questioning the abilities of all the professionals, foresters, civil society members, who were involved in conceptualizing REDD from Bali to Paris and then up to Kathmandu. I can assure you that the professionals now working on carrying forward of R-PIN Nepal are aware and potentially poised to design carbon trading concept for Nepal, that is equitable, inclusive, economically viable and environmentally sound. Hence no need to see snake in the rope!!!
Best rgds
Rajan Kotru
Global Land Tool Network e-Forum
I know this is short notice, but I invite you all (if you are not already participating)to join in the final week of discussion on the (UN_Habitat) Global Land Tool Network's e-Forum on developing pro-poor, gender sensitive land tools to increase land access by the world's poorest people: www.gltn.net
Figuring out how carbon markets and other ecosystem service markets can benefit the poor and secure their land tenure is very important. Please post whatever insights you have about how to do this. All contributions to the Forum will be presented at an international workgroup conference. You need to let the rest of know how to understand this issue so as to inform grassroots organizations who are working to develop pro-poor land access tools.
REDD fails forests and peoples
Interesting discourse on REDD! A report finds this whole process to date has been rushed, implicitly directed towards a market based REDD and dominated by centralized government, with little to no consultation with indigenous peoples, local communities or civil society organizations. Furthermore, the review finds that the FCPF is not meeting some of the key social commitments it has made.
Read report http://www.fern.org/media/documents/document_4307_4308.pdf
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